We investigate binary voting systems with two types of voters and a hierarchy among the members in each type, so that members in one class have more influence or importance than members in the other class. The purpose of this paper is to count, up to isomorphism, the number of these voting systems for an arbitrary number of voters. We obtain a closed formula for the number of these systems, this formula follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial variation on the number of voters.
Introduction
We consider voting systems in which each player casts a "yes" or "no" vote, and the outcome is a collective "yes" or "no". These voting systems, known in the literature as simple games, can be very complicated. Their specialization to symmetric simple games, however, are simple indeed; each such game corresponds to the qualified majority rule, in which an issue is passed if and only if the number of voters in favour meets or exceeds some threshold or quota. We refer, as in [5] , to this result as May's Theorem for Simple Games "with bias"
1 . Thus, May's Theorem with bias may be stated as follows: for each positive integer n, there is, up to isomorphism, a unique simple game that is anonymous or symmetric (i.e., voters play an equivalent rôle in the game). At least two facts are relevant of this result:
1. all symmetric games are weighted, 2 2. the function S on the number of voters n that counts all these games is, up to isomorphism, the identity, i.e., S(n) = n.
There seems to be only one natural direction in which to extend symmetric games 3 within simple games. To accommodate this new class of voting systems, we make two changes to the symmetric simple games: we allow two classes of symmetric voters instead of one, and we consider that voters in one class are more influential or important than voters in the other class. The goal of this paper is to analyze the joint effect of these two changes. What voting systems are possible? How many of them are these, up to isomorphism, for a fixed number of voters?
As we shall see in this paper, the obtained results are paradoxically opposed to those described above for symmetric games, which demonstrates that the complexity of these close voting systems is considerably higher than that of symmetric games. Indeed, we will prove that the number of them is F (n + 6) − (n 2 + 4n + 8), where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers 4 , being n the number of voters. Hence, the number of these games is asymptotically exponential, which contrasts with the linear behavior of symmetric games.
The paper is organized as follows. Basic definitions and preliminary results are included in Section 2. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, which is devoted to count the number of voting systems in terms of the number of voters, resulting a closed formula with asymptotic exponential behavior.
Preliminaries
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. 
Thus, for a non-null voter i there is at least a coalition S such that S ∈ W , i ∈ S and S \ {i} ∈ L. Real-world examples of simple games are given by Taylor [9, 10] .
The "desirability" relation defined on the set of voters represents a way to make precise the idea that a particular voting system may give one voter more influence than another. Isbell already used it in [7] .
(ii) Players i and j are equally desirable
(iii) Player i is strictly more desirable than player j (i ≻ j, in short) in (N, W ) iff i is more desirable than j, but i and j are not equally desirable.
Definition 2.3 A simple game (N, W ) is complete or linear if the desirability relation is a complete preordering.
In the field of Boolean algebra, complete games correspond to 2-monotonic positive Boolean functions, which were already considered in [6] . The problem of identifying this type of functions by using polynomial-time recognition have been treated in [1, 2] . In a complete simple game we may decompose N in a collection of subsets, called classes, N 1 > N 2 > · · · > N t , forming a partition of N , and understanding that if i ∈ N p and j ∈ N q then: p = q if and only if i ≈ j; and p < q if and only if i ≻ j. Now we are going to define the δ-ordering, introduced in [4] for an arbitrary number of types of voters.
Definition 2.4
Let n be the number of players of a complete simple game (N, W ) with two types of players
Then the rectangle of (n 1 + 1) × (n 2 + 1) profiles for (N, W ) is:
In I n1 × I n2 , the δ-ordering given by the comparison of partial sums is:
It is not difficult to check that the pair (I n1 × I n2 , δ) is a distributive lattice that possesses a maximum element (n 1 , n 2 ) and a minimum element (0, 0). The profiles in I n1 × I n2 can be completely ordered by the lexicographical ordering:
The following known result has three parts. The first part shows how to associate a vector (n 1 , n 2 ) and a matrix M to a complete simple game (N, W ), and describes the restrictions that these parameters need to fulfill. The second part establishes that every pair of isomorphic complete simple games (N, W ) and (N ′ , W ′ ) corresponds to the same associated vector (n 1 , n 2 ) and matrix M (uniqueness). The third part shows that a vector (n 1 , n 2 ) and a matrix M fulfilling the conditions in Part A always correspond to a complete simple game (N, W ) (existence). where the first coalition corresponds to profile (2, 0), the last coalition to profile (0, 3) and the remaining coalitions to profile (1, 2).
Theorem 2.6 is a parametrization theorem because it allows one to enumerate all complete games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain invariants. We will see in next section that such enumeration can be done for every number of voters.
Counting complete games with two types of voters: Fibonacci numbers
We establish a relation between the number of non-isomorphic complete simple games with n voters of two different types and the Fibonacci numbers.
Definition 3.1 Let H(n) denote the number of non-isomorphic complete simple games with n voters of two different types.
Note that H(n) is the number of matrices
such that there exists (n 1 , n 2 ) ∈ N × N, with n = n 1 + n 2 , verifying Properties (1) − (2) of Theorem 2.6-(A).
where F (n) is the n-th Fibonacci number.
The proof of this theorem is a consequence of some additional definitions and lemmas. 
Proof: We consider three cases depending on the relation between a, s and b.
By definition, it is clear that N (a, s, b) is equal to 0 whenever s − a > b.
Note that s − a = b implies r = 1. In fact, we just have one matrix with one row
Thus, N (a, s, s − a) = 1. That is,
On the other hand, since N (i, j, b) = 0 if j > i + b (Case 1 ), we have that
Now, by mathematical induction we are going to prove the equality
By induction hypothesis [i.h.], it is clear that
where we define
From now on we will use some elementary combinatorial equalities like [3] 
First, we consider the following equalities 
Finally, the equality for s − a < b follows from Equations (1), (2) and, furthermore, H(n) = F (n + 6) − (n 2 + 4n + 8).
Proof: From Definition 3.1 and 3.5, where H(n) and G(a, b) are respectively defined, it is clear that
G(a, n − a).
Thus, we just have to prove that n a=1 G(a, n − a) = F (n + 6) − (n 2 + 4n + 8).
In fact, taking into account that G(0, n) = 0, Lemma 3.6, and the known identity of Fibonacci numbers [3] F (n) = = F (n + 6) − (n 2 + 4n + 8).
